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Abstract- The growing popularity of mobile devices (smart 
phones, handsets, PDAs) along with 3G technology brings the 
mobile internet services on these devices. The wireless devices 
with messaging capabilities attracted the malware writers to 
target the hand held devices. Even though the mobile device 
have numerous benefits like mobility, compact size and ease of 
their connectivity, the open nature increases the threats and 
risks being posed. The mobile viruses so far discovered 
exploited vulnerabilities in Bluetooth by infecting nearby 
devices and then propagate through SMS to other devices in 
the mobile network. The problem becomes worse with the 
growth of MMS (Multimedia Messaging Service), mobile game, 
and mobile commerce in near future. This paper investigates 
the propagation of mobile worms and viruses that spread 
primarily via SMS/MMS messages and short range radio 
interfaces – Bluetooth. 
Keywords- Bluetooth, Bluetooth Security, Mobile Threats, 
Radio frequency, and Worms. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Bluetooth Architecture 
 
luetooth technology is a low cost and low power 
technology. It is primarily used in short-range radio 
frequency (RF) communication. It is a protocol used for 
connecting set of wireless devices, ranging from PDAs, 
Mobile phones, Notebook computers, Microwave ovens, 
Refrigerators etc,. The Bluetooth specification was 
developed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), an 
industry consortium founded by Ericsson, IBM, Intel, 
Nokia, and Toshiba. Bluetooth radio operates in the 2.4 GHz 
unlicensed ISM band (Industrial, Scientific, and Medical). 
Two or more devices sharing the same channel form a 
piconet. There is one master device and upto seven active 
slave devices in a piconet. The 
devices can be in any one of the state action, shift, hold, and 
park. Multiple piconet with overlapping coverage areas form 
a scatter net. Bluetooth Network – piconet and scatter net is 
shown in figure1 [8]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1. Bluetooth Network [piconet, scatternet] 
 
The Bluetooth supports both point-to-point connection and 
point-to-multipoint connection. In point-to-multipoint 
connection, the channel is shared among several Bluetooth 
devices. The channel is divided into time slots, each 625μs 
in length where each slot corresponds to an RF hop 
frequency. The hop rate is 1600 hops/s, Bluetooth uses 
frequency hopping for low interference and fading, uses 
TDD (Time-Division-Duplex) scheme for full duplex 
transmission and transmits using GFSK (Gausian Frequency 
Shift Keying) modulation. 
The protocol uses a combination of circuit and packet 
switching. Bluetooth protocol stack can support 
asynchronous connection-less (ACL) link for data and up to 
three simultaneous synchronous connection oriented (SCO) 
links for voice or a combination of asynchronous data and 
synchronous voice (DV packet type). There are Transport 
Protocol group, Middleware protocol group and Application 
group in the protocol stack. The Transport group protocols 
are used to manage physical and logical links with higher 
layer protocols and applications and allow Bluetooth device 
to locate each other. The Radio, Baseband, Link Manager, 
Logical link control and Adaption (L2CAP) layers and the 
Host controller and Interfaces (HCI) are included in the 
transport protocol group. Third party industry standard 
protocols and Bluetooth SIG developed protocols are 
included in middleware protocol group. Industry standard 
protocols include point-to-point, Internet protocols. TCP, 
WAP and Object Exchange Protocol, RFCOMM, Telephony 
B 
P a g e  | 10    Vol. 10 Issue 1 (Ver  1.0), April 2010 Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology 
 
control signaling protocol and service discovery protocol 
comes under Bluetooth SIG developed protocols. The 
Bluetooth protocol stack is shown in Figure 2 [15]. The 
IEEE standard 802.15.1 standard for Bluetooth was 
published in 2002. The IEEE standard defines only the 
physical (PHY) and MAC (Medium Access Control) layer 
in its standards.[7] 
 
B. Device Discovery in Bluetooth 
 
In Bluetooth environment before a connection is established, 
device discovery procedure has to be performed before 
packets start flowing in the wireless links between the 
master and slave devices and vice versa. When a Bluetooth 
device wants to find other devices in its vicinity, it broadcast 
inquiry packets by hopping 3200 times per second along a 
32-channel inquiry hopping sequence. A nearby device in 
the discoverable mode listens on the same frequency 
sequence but moves 
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Figure 2: Bluetooth Protocol stack 
 
forward its listening carrier every 1.28 seconds. When a 
device hears an inquiry packet it backs off for a random 
period of time and then reenters the scanning state. When it 
receives another inquiry packet, it responds with a frequency 
hop synchronization (FHS) packet. On the arrival of this 
packet, the inquirer device discovers the responders. Once a 
device has discovered its neighboring devices, it may want 
to establish a connection with one or more of them. In order 
to set up a Bluetooth link with a neighbor device, it goes 
through the paging process. This process is similar to the 
inquiry process, except that the paging device explicitly 
specifies the receivers address to indicate which device it 
wants to set up a connection with. After a connection is 
established, the pager device and the paged device are called 
the master and slave of the new link respectively. In the 
connected state, the master and the slave can exchange 
normal data packets by hopping 1,600 times per second 
along a 79-channel frequency sequence decided by the 
master‘s local clock and its device address. [12] 
 
C. Bluetooth Security 
 
Bluetooth provides security in three ways: 
i. It uses pseudo-random frequency hoping to solve 
the problem of interference from other signals after 
transmitting or receiving a packet. 
ii. Authentication to restrict connectivity to devices. 
Authentication is initiated when the device is in 
security mode 2 or in security mode 3. 
iii. It uses encryption to employ secret keys, where 
only authorized users can make data intelligible 
again. 
Frequency –hopping scheme 
Bluetooth users use Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum 
(FHSS) when transmitting signals. A channel is used for a 
very short period (e.g. 625μs for data/voice links) followed 
by a hop marked by a predetermined pseudo-random 
sequence to another. The frequency-hopping scheme enables 
the Bluetooth device to avoid interference with other 
devices. Bluetooth also allows for radio link power control, 
a low power consumption adaption output scheme, where 
devices can negotiate and adjust their radio link power 
consumption relative to the transmitted signal intensity. The 
combinations of a frequency hopping scheme and radio link 
power control provide Bluetooth with some additional 
protection from eavesdropping and malicious access. Spread 
spectrum transmission are less affected by outside signal 
interference since any noise interference is likely to affect 
only a small portion of the signal and not impact the entire 
signal. 
Security Modes 
All Bluetooth enabled device implement the Generic Access 
profile. The profile defines a security model that includes 
three security modes: 
Security Mode 1 
i. Mode 1 is as insecure mode of operation. It 
provides no security. 
ii. When a Bluetooth device is in security mode 1, no 
security procedure is initiated. 
iii. Device operating in this mode are able to pair with 
devices operating in the same mode because neither 
device implements security controls. 
  Security Mode 2 
i. Mode 2 is known as service level enforced security, 
provides security at the service level after the 
channel has been established. This mode enables 
applications to run in parallel and have different 
access policies. 
ii. When a Bluetooth device is in security mode 2 no 
security procedure is initiated before a channel 
establishment request has been received or a 
channel establishment procedure has been initiated 
by itself. 
iii. Device operating in this mode enforce service level 
security at the L2CAP layer and above by 
involving authorization and authentication scheme. 
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Security Mode 3 
i. Mode 3 known as link level enforced security 
provides security at the link level before the 
channel is established. 
ii. Link encryption is enforced by devices operating in 
mode 3 at the LMP layer.[10] 
 
II BACKGROUND STUDY 
 
A. Bluetooth Security Issues 
 
Bluetooth protocol is a PAN protocol used by devices that 
communicate wirelessly with one another within 300 feet. 
Bluetooth is designed to run in a peer-peer short-range 
wireless network. If the security of Bluetooth is 
compromised and if one or more devices in the network are 
used as gateways to other connected network, it could 
expose the devices or their attached networks. If the network 
is adhoc there is no access point, there is no centralized 
mechanism for security administration as there with a WAN 
where MAC address filtering and other security mechanisms 
are used to provide protection against rogue access.  
Additional to this there are security concerns for Bluetooth 
mobile phones, where information stored on them such as 
the addresses and phone numbers of contacts, calendar 
information and Emails can be stolen. Blue bugging in a 
hacking technique that access the phone‘s commands, 
allowing the hacker to make phone calls, and delete contact 
information or eavesdrop on the phone owner‘s 
conversation. Cell phone worms take advantage of the 
Bluetooth technology to propagate to other Bluetooth 
devices. 
Everyday more and more viruses and worms have been 
surfaced on the mobile devices. Bluetooth worms are 
significantly different from Internet worms in three ways. A 
Bluetooth enabled device controlled by the worm can only 
infect neighbors within its radio range. This differs from 
Internet worms that often scan the entire IP address space 
for susceptible victims. Second the bandwidth available to 
Bluetooth devices is much narrower that those of Internet 
links. Finally the mobility of Bluetooth worm is dynamic 
when compared with Internet worm. In future the attack on 
the Bluetooth enabled devices may be severer in the form of 
handset downtime, service description due to Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks, physical damage in device hardware 
and theft of sensitive data on the device [3][4][5][6][9][11]. 
 
B. Study On Mobile Malwares 
 
The earliest versions of malicious codes are harmless and 
they didn‘t spread from device to device. The recent 
malicious malwares are capable of spreading to nearby 
devices via Bluetooth and pose serious threats on enterprise 
networks. The Table.1 shows the classification of Malwares, 
its spreading mechanism, target platforms 
etc.[1][2][13][14][16][17][18]. 
III RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This study focuses on the initial investigation of the 
Bluetooth worm‘s nature and its characters. The main 
difference between Blue tooth worm and the Internet worm 
is the mechanism adapted by the worms to infect the 
devices. The Blue tooth worm uses proximity scanning 
process to infect the nearby devices. 
A simulation environment is setup with the basic RWP 
(Random Way Point) mobile model. It is a simple model in 
which an entity randomly selects a destination in the 
rectangle area. It moves straight from the current position 
towards the destination at a uniform speed. When it reaches 
the destination, it is idle for a period of time, which is again 
uniformly distributed. Once it enters into active state from 
idle state, it chooses another destination and the process 
repeats. 
Cabir & Comwarrior are the most popular worms that 
affects Bluetooth enabled devices.Cabir replicates over 
Bluetooth connection and install its payload as Symbian 
System Installation file(SSI).It drains the power of infected 
phones and starts scanning for next Bluetooth devices for 
infection. Comwarrior spreads through the messages sent, in 
which the payload is attached. When it reaches a MMS 
enabled phones it randomly choose a phone number from 
the device address book and resets the infected device on the 
1st hour of 14th of any month. After infecting a phone, it 
searches for nearby Bluetooth enabled devices for sending 
infected files.  
The simulation window is set for 3600 seconds. The first 
worm is chosen randomly for a set of 200 devices and the 
infection starts at simulation time of 0 seconds. Fig.3 shows 
the Cabir worms attack ratio. With increase of time 
(seconds) the graph shows the increase of attack vector 
created by the Cabir worm. Fig.4 shows the Comwarrior 
attack ratio. With increase of time (seconds) the graph 
shows the increase of attack vector created by the 
Comwarrior worm.Fig.5 shows the average infection caused 
by the Cabir worm. The infection rate is higher or lower 
according to the number of Bluetooth enabled devices / 
applications that are within the affected device vicinity.Fig.6 
show the average infection caused by the Comwarrior 
worm. The infection rate increases with time. 
The simulation result shows the impact of Cabir worm and 
Comwarrior worm on Bluetooth enabled applications. 
 
Figure 3. Attack Ratio 
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Figure 4. Attack Ratio 
 
 
Figure 5. Avg – Infection 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Avg – Infection 
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Table1. Year wise findings of Malwares in Bluetooth enabled devices 
Year 
Malware 
Type 
Malware Name 
 
Vulnerabilities 
 
 
2000 [1] 
Virus 
 
Phage 
 
Spreads from PDA to PDA if infected files are shared 
 
2000 [1] Worm 
The Spanish 
Timophonica 
It sends message to random GSM phone numbers via SMS gateway. It modifies MS 
outlook settings and device registry of an infected device. It also deletes CMOS 
memory and Master boot records of the device. It propagates through email. 
 
2000 [1] Worm The Japanese 110 
Affects .NIT DO CO MO i-mode mobile phones. Individual phone numbers in the 
address book can become victims of Dos attack. 
 
2001 [1] Virus Liberty A 
It affects hand held devices like palm PDAs, palm OS. To activate this virus it has to 
be manually installed. It deletes all applications and databases on palm OS-
compatible device. 
 
2004 [1] Worm Mabir 
Spreads by selecting addresses of newly received MMS messages. It transmits MMS 
messages. 
 
2004 -
2005 [1] 
Worm Cabir 
Its variants replicate over Bluetooth connections and install the worm payload as a 
symbian system Installation (SSI) file. 
 
2005 [1] 
Worm / 
Virus 
Lasco 
It propagate by transferring its payload to any device in range. It combines the self 
replication of virus with the self propagation capability of worms. 
 
2005 [1] Worm Commwarrior 
Propagate by sending messages (along with the payload) to an MMS-enabled phone 
number randomly chosen from the compromised device‘s address book and resets 
the infected device on the first hour of 14th of any month. 
 
2005 [1] Trojan Skulls 
Propagates by sending both SMS and MMS messages and overwrites address books, 
e-mail viewer etc. 
 
2005 [1] Trojan Drever 
Propagates by prompting a user to install an update for symbian OS. Its primary 
damage is to disable symbian antivirus programs. 
 
2005 [1] Trojan Locknut 
It propagates like Lasco and overwrites ROM binaries and may crash the OS. 
 
2005 [1] Trojan Cardblock 
It attacks multimedia cards flash memory of mobile phones. 
 
2005 [1] Virus WinCE.Duts 
Protect Pc Virus infecting ARM based device. It appends itself to the executable files 
in the root folder and modifies the program execution leader. 
 
2006 [1] Virus Crois over 
Spreads from windows desktop PCs to mobile devices running on  
windows mobile pocket Pc. 
 
2007 
[16][17] 
Worm Cabir,I,cabir.H 
Spread through specially formatted symbian OS distribution file distinguished as a 
security management utility. When the infected file, is launched the mobile phone‘s 
screen displays the word ―velasco‖. 
2008 
[16][17] 
Worm Boselo.A 
This worm is transmitted thru MMS users are deceived by the extension and 
unknowingly install the piece, the worm. A targets symbian s60-enabled/malicious 
device includes Nokia-6600, 6630, 6680, 7610, N70 and N72 handsets. 
2009 
[16][17] 
Worm Yxes.A 
Gathers mobile phone nos and repeatedly send sms. The message feature a web 
malicious web address (URL) upon clicking of the address in the received message, 
the recipients will download a copy of the worm. 
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IV CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
 
The RWP model takes time (seconds) as a control 
parameter. It takes more time for propagation and less time 
for infection.  The study of mobile virus / worms exploiting 
Bluetooth and messaging networks needs an enhanced 
model. Agent based Malware Model (AMM) is the most 
popular mobility model for analyzing the epidemic growth 
rate of Bluetooth worms. AMM focuses on the worm that 
spreads only with the help of human intervention. Further 
study has to be focused on the propagation speed and 
infection rate caused by the worms that spreads 
automatically in the Bluetooth network. 
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